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Doughert, Kevin J. Leadership Lessons: The Campaigns for Vicksburg,
1862-1863. Casemate, $32.95 ISBN 978-1-61200-003-9
Taking Civil War Leaders to Task
Kevin Dougherty’s Leadership Lessons: The Campaigns for Vicksburg,
1862-1863 offers a concise summary of the events that led to the city’s capture
in July, 1863, but focuses on the campaign’s utility as a primer for modern
leaders in “war, business, politics, communities, families and schools" (201).
The book has some value for historians interested in a brief synopsis of the
campaign itself but would more readily find an audience among students of
military and strategic studies and even non-military readers searching for
leadership “lessons" from the past that they could apply in current and future
endeavors. As such, it is unlikely to replace recent authoritative accounts of the
campaigns (such as Michael Ballard’s magisterial Vicksburg) but may make the
events of the campaign known to a wider audience outside of military and Civil
War circles.
The work is divided into two sections: a brief (40 pp.) summary of events
entitled “Understanding Vicksburg" that places the events in context and far
exceeds any other summary of similar length. But the bulk of the book (160 pp.)
is in the second section, “Leadership Vignettes," which provides thirty separate
short, (typically five page) synopses of how either decisive leadership or
leadership failures influenced some important aspect of the campaign, ending
with several bullet-point “takeaways" for the reader to apply in their own
situations. As each vignette is designed to stand alone, this leads to some
repetition, both in the second part of the book with the first, and throughout the
second, as essential elements often have to be repeated to set up each vignette. In
addition, the accounts feel somewhat formulaic and reveal the U.S. Army’s
penchant (Dougherty is a retired U.S. Army officer) for concise ‘lessons
learned,’ that can sometimes rob a topic of its essential complexity and the
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important mental exercise of allowing a reader (and leader) to draw their own
conclusions rather than having a formulaic answer provided for them.
The summary seeks to place the campaign in the context of the war and
further demonstrates the western theater’s importance to the eventual
Confederate defeat. For example, Dougherty notes that Vicksburg is “considered
by many historians to be the Civil War’s decisive action," and suggests that the
capture of Vicksburg was “more decisive" than Gettysburg (24, 37). But, if
anything, Dougherty overemphasizes the river’s importance to the Union. He
argues that the Mississippi was the “single most important economic feature of
the North American continent" and its closure “threatened to strangle northern
commercial interests" (25). While this might have been true prior to the spread of
the railroad, by 1860, water navigation had been largely supplanted by the iron
rails that bound the East to the Midwest, leading eventually to Chicago replacing
New Orleans as the most important commercial center between the Appalachians
and the Rockies. The river was certainly important to the Confederate cause,
especially in providing access to resources from the Trans-Mississippi region,
but it had grown comparatively less so for the North.
The vignettes concentrate disproportionally on both senior leaders (only one
enlisted man is featured) and on successful rather than unsuccessful examples,
testing the adage that we learn more from our failures than successes. Ulysses S.
Grant is featured eight times, all in laudatory accounts, while John C. Pemberton
is the subject of four largely, and correctly, critical examinations. The only other
figure featured more than once is William T. Sherman (three times). Dougherty’s
vignettes do much to further explode the myth of southern superiority in military
leadership and demonstrate that the campaign’s outcome was as much as
anything else the product of “superior Federal leadership," but avoid boiling the
campaign down into a rather simplistic binary of good and bad (197). While
Union commanders made critical decisions that led to success and Confederate
strategists (Jefferson Davis and Joe Johnston are featured once each) led directly
to the defeat, solid Confederate field leadership (in the persons of John Bowen
and Lloyd Tilghman) and Union missteps (exemplified by John McClernand) are
also featured, providing essential balance to the work.
Dougherty is at his best when tying leadership development to earlier
events, further demonstrating the importance of historical context. As an
example, vignettes Fifteen and Sixteen demonstrate that Grant’s famous decision
to “cut loose" from his supply lines actually emulated his mentor, Winfield
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Scott’s decision during the Mexico City campaign of 1847. Likewise, Pemberton
mislearned a number of leadership lessons in Mexico while serving as an aide to
the autocratic and inflexible William Worth. These examples demonstrate, as
Dougherty has in an excellent earlier work, Civil War Leadership and Mexican
War Experience, the importance of prior experiences in leadership development,
but also serve to emphasize that both men’s most formative influences came
from practical experience and not, presumably, from reading leadership primers.
The book suffers from minor omissions in copy editing (p. 27,
McClernand’s XVII Corps should be XIII Corps, p. 180 where the “blame must
wrest (sic) with Davis," p. 189 Meridien should be Meridian, Mississippi) but is
generally well-written and useful to a wide variety of readers. It suffers from the
lack of an Index yet curiously includes an otherwise excellent thirty page “Order
of Battle" that is useful but not particularly relevant. The bibliography combines
works directly related to the campaign and other leadership texts but omits
Timothy Smith’s Champion Hill, which is surprising given that Dougherty
acknowledges that the engagement was the “decisive battle of the Vicksburg
Campaign" (149). The slim volume is slightly overpriced, but historians not
familiar with the specific military aspects of the campaign will find the summary
far more useful than an Osprey book or wikipedia article, while cadets and
midshipmen will garner a number of ideas and techniques to add to their own
leadership toolboxes. His history is generally quite solid, but Dougherty reveals
early on his primary purpose in writing the book: (he currently serves as a
Tactical Officer at the Citadel in Charleston) to “crystallize the lessons for the
reader," relieving them of the burden but also denying them both the benefits and
the joys of the exercise (9).
Christopher M. Rein is an Assistant Professor of History at the U.S. Air
Force Academy in Colorado Springs, CO.
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